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Abstract
This paper assesses the effect of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) on the labor supply of
Americans ages 50 and older. Using data from the Health and Retirement Study and the Medical
Expenditure Panel Survey, we estimate a dynamic programming model of retirement that 
accounts for both saving and uncertain medical expenses. Importantly, we model the two key
channels by which health insurance rates are predicted to change: the Medicaid expansion and 
the subsidized private exchanges.
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1 Introduction 
The Afordable Care Act (ACA) is the most signifcant reform to the health care sector in 
since the 1960s. The ACA's provisions fall into four main categories: (1) an expansion of Med-
icaid; (2) an overhaul of private non-group insurance, including community rating, coverage 
standards, the introduction of exchanges, subsidies, and purchase mandates; (3) a mandate 
for large employers to ofer health insurance coverage, and subsidies for smaller employers; 
(4) miscellaneous provisions including reforms to coverage standards, the tax code, and the 
management of Medicare.1 In this paper, we assess the impact of the Medicaid and private 
non-group insurance provisions of the ACA on the labor supply and saving of Americans 
ages 50 and older. Using an estimated structural model of worker behavior, we focus on key 
provisions of the ACA that are likely to afect older workers. 
We consider the following two sets of provisions. First, the ACA expands Medicaid eligibility 
for low-income households younger than 65. Prior to the ACA, low-income households near-
ing retirement qualifed for Medicaid only if they were disabled. Moreover, under the ACA 
Medicaid applicants no longer face an asset test, meaning that they can qualify for Medicaid 
even if they hold signifcant wealth. The ability to carry wealth into retirement should make 
Medicaid more attractive for older workers. Overall, the Medicaid expansion could either 
increase or reduce labor supply by the elderly. Perhaps most likely, fewer people will work, as 
they can now qualify for Medicaid if they retire. 
The second set of provisions involves non-group insurance. The ACA establishes exchanges 
where households without group coverage can purchase insurance. The policies ofered on these 
exchanges must meet coverage standards, and they must be community-rated, i.e., insurers 
cannot price-discriminate by health. The ACA also requires uninsured households ineligible 
for Medicaid to purchase insurance, provides tax subsidies for most purchases, and levies 
penalties on those not complying. These changes should signifcantly alter the customer base 
and actuarial costs in the non-group market. Although the subsidies will allow most households 
to purchase non-group insurance more cheaply, healthy and/or lightly subsidized individuals 
may see their premiums rise. Because many workers lose their employer-provided insurance 
1 A comprehensive list can be found in The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, (2013). 
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after they leave their job (and the COBRA buy-in period expires), changes in the price of 
non-group insurance may change their retirement decisions. Because most people will be 
able to buy non-group health insurance more cheaply, early retirement will probably increase. 
Balancing against this, the subsidies provided under the ACA will allow uninsured low-income 
workers to purchase cheap insurance in the non-group market. Prior to the ACA these people 
may have used default on medical bills as a substitute for health insurance. However, default 
is a good substitute for insurance only when income and assets are low. Acquiring health 
insurance may encourage these workers to work and save more (Hsu, 2013). 
Because the subsidies decrease with income, they also generate work disincentives. As Mulli-
gan, (2013) points out, like most means-tested transfers, the ACA subsidies efectively impose 
a tax on income. 
Our goal is to assess the quantitative importance of these efects. To do this, we will extend 
the structural labor supply and retirement model in French and Jones, (2011) to account for 
these reforms. We extend their model by adding in a much more detailed model of medical 
spending and insurance. We model explicitly how diferent types of health insurance plans 
afect the premiums and coinsurance rates that households face. We use data from the Health 
and Retirement Study (HRS) and the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) to estimate 
the structural model. We use the MEPS data to measure current medical expenditures, as well 
as who pays for these expenditures (out of pocket, private insurance, Medicaid, etc.). We use 
this information to estimate a dynamic programming model of labor supply and retirement 
behavior where individuals face realistic medical expense risk. Upon estimating the model, we 
conduct counterfactual experiments, where we modify the premia and co-insurance rates, net 
of subsidies and penalties, that households face. 
The Afordable Care Act has many detailed provisions. Here we describe the key aspects of 
the law. 
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2 The Afordable Care Act 
2.1 Medicaid 
Prior to the ACA, very few men younger than 65 were eligible for Medicaid, unless they were 
disabled. In 2014, participating states became able to ofer Medicaid to all households earning 
less than 138% of the Federal Poverty Line, about $33,000 for a family of four. Currently 32 
states plus the District of Columbia have enacted the expansion. 
To qualify for Medicaid, households must pass an income test. The income measure used in 
the test is Modifed Adjusted Gross Income, which is Adjusted Gross Income from tax forms 
with a few minor modifcations. Modifed Adjusted Gross Income includes labor income, Social 
Security (but not SSI) income, as well as interest and other sources of capital income. An 
important change in the Medicaid eligibility rules is that there is no longer an asset test. As 
long as their asset income does not violate the income test, wealthy households can retire early 
and qualify for Medicaid. 
2.2 Health insurance exchanges, tax subsidies and penalties 
For uninsured households not eligible for Medicaid, the ACA facilitates the purchase of non-
group health insurance by establishing exchanges, providing subsidies, and imposing a purchase 
mandate. These changes should signifcantly alter participation, actuarial costs, and efective 
purchase prices in the non-group market. 
The ACA establishes exchanges for the private purchase of individual non-group health insur-
ance. Policies ofered on these exchanges must belong to one of 4 categories  bronze, silver, 
gold and platinum  according to their actuarial value, the expected fraction of total medical 
expenses covered by the insurer. The benchmark category is the silver category, consisting of 
policies with actuarial values of at least 70%, but actuarial values can range from 60% (bronze) 
to 90% (platinum). All plans must cap the total amount the individual pays out-of-pocket 
through deductibles and co-pays. In 2014 the out-of-pocket limit could not exceed $6,350 for 
individual plans and $12,700 for family plans. Above this level the insurer covers 100% of 
billable medical expenses. Another important aspect of the ACA is that all plans must be 
community-rated. Plans cannot difer by health status, although they may to some extent 
difer by age. 
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Families with income between 100% and 400% of the Federal Poverty Limit (FPL) qualify for 
subsidies on their insurance premia. The subsidy formula specifes the fraction of income these 
households are expected to spend on a "typical" insurance policy. Premium expenditures on 
the typical plan in excess of this amount are rebated as tax credits. The expenditure cap rises 
with household income until income exceeds 400% of the FPL. Beyond that threshold there is 
no subsidy (Fernandez, 2014). In contrast, low income individuals are responsible for almost 
no costs, and can enjoy a subsidy as high as 100% of the premium. Households with income 
between 100% and 250% of the FPL are also entitled to "cost-sharing subsidies" that lower 
the out-of-pocket spending caps and raise the actuarial values of their policies. For families 
with income below 150% of the FPL, the out-of-pocket limit decreases to 36% of the normal 
limit, and the actuarial value of the plan increases to 94%. (Fernandez 2014, Center on Budget 
and Policy Priorities 2015). Because both the premium and cost-sharing subsidies fall with 
income, they are implicit income taxes: see Mulligan, (2013) and Harris and Mok, (2015). 
Households who do not purchase insurance or receive it through their employers must pay 
a "shared responsibility" penalty. This penalty, which is the larger of a income-independent 
charge based on household composition or a fraction of household income, was phased in 
between 2014 and 2016. For example, the penalty for a family of 4 has risen from the greater 
of $285 or 1% of income to the greater of $2,085 or 2.5% of income. 
2.3 Employer Mandate 
The ACA afects the share of individuals who are ofered employer provided health insurance, 
because of penalties that frms must pay. Firms employing fewer than 50 employees must 
provide health insurance, or pay a penalty of $3,000 for each full time employee, up to a 
maximum of $2,000 times the number of full- time employees minus 30. The penalty is 
increased each year by the growth in insurance premiums. 
If the employer has 25 or fewer employees and average wage up to $50,000, it may be eligible 
for a health insurance tax credit. 
Individuals working at large frms may see their coverage rise. Small low wage frms will have 
added incentives to cut their health insurance plans, since their workers can receive free or 
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low cost health insurance from Medicaid or exchanges. Workers at these frms may be willing 
to accept the loss of health insurance for only a small increase in wages. For this reason, the 
Congressional Budget Ofce predicts that employer provided coverage will fall slightly under 
the ACA. 
Because the predicted efect of the ACA comes mostly through the growth of non-group 
insurance on exchanges and through Medicaid, we focus on these margins. We assume no 
change in the structure of employer provided insurance: those covered by employer provided 
insurance before the reform continue to be covered, those not covered by employer provided 
coverage will continue not to be covered. 
2.. Total Cost and Total Projected Increase in Insurance Coverage 
The Congressional Budget Ofce, (2015) projects the total net cost of the ACA's "insurance 
components" for 2016 to be $67 billion, or roughly 0.4% of US GDP. Of this amount, $44 billion 
is due to increased Medicaid costs, $41 billion is due to the insurance exchange subsidies, andl 
$1 billion is due to small business subsidies. The government is also projected to collect an 
additional $19 billion through taxes and penalties. 
In terms of insured individuals, the CBO projects the ACA to reduce the number of uninsured 
by 19 million in 2016. 20 million additional people would be covered through insurance ex-
changes, and 8 million additional people would be covered through through Medicaid and the 
Children's Health Insurance Program, while 10 million fewer people would receive employer-
provided coverage or purchase of-exchange non-group coverage (Congressional Budget Ofce, 
2015). According to the Gallup-Healthways poll (Marken, 2016), between the fourth quarter 
of 2013 and the third quarter of 2016, the uninsurance rate among people aged 18-64 fell by 
7.5 percentage points. The fraction of people insured in the private non-group market rose 
by 3.9 percentage points and the fraction insured by Medicaid rose by 2.5 percentage points. 
Other types of insurance (e.g., Medicare) rose as well. The fraction of people insured by their 
employer fell by 0.8 percentage points. It is difcult to know how many of these workers, if 
any, lost their employer-provided health insurance as a result of the ACA. 
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3 The Model 
The model used in this paper expands the framework developed in French and Jones, (2011) 
to capture the detail of the U.S. health insurance system. The resulting model is very complex 
and has many parameters. Appendix A provides defnitions for all the variables used in the 
main text. 
3.1 Preferences and Demographics 
Consider a household head with marital status SPt, where SPt = 1 if the head has a spouse 
or partner and 0 otherwise. This individual seeks to maximize his expected discounted (where 
the subjective discount factor is β) lifetime utility at age t, t = 51, 60, ..., 95. Each period that 
he lives, the individual derives utility from consumption, Ct, and hours of leisure, Lt. The 
within-period utility function is of the form 
� �1−ν γ1 Ct 1−γ(1) U(Ct, Lt) = L .t1 − ν (1 + SPt).7
We allow both β and γ to vary across individuals. Individuals with higher values of β are more 
patient, while individuals with higher values of γ place less weight on leisure. We follow Scholz 
and Seshadri, (2013) and many others by using equivalence scales, so that the consumption 
needs of a couple are less than twice as great as the consumption needs of two singles. The 
quantity of leisure is 
(2) Lt = L − Nt − φPtPt − φREREt − φH Ht, 
where L is the individual's total annual time endowment. Participation in the labor force is 
denoted by Pt, a 0-1 indicator equal to one when hours worked, Nt, are positive. The fxed cost 
of work, φPt, is treated as a loss of leisure. Including fxed costs helps us capture the empirical 
regularity that annual hours of work are clustered around 2000 hours and 0 hours (Cogan, 
1981). Following a number of studies,2 we allow preferences for leisure, in our case the value 
2 Examples include Rust and Phelan, (1997), Blau and Gilleskie, (2006) and Blau and Gilleskie, (2008), 
Gustman and Steinmeier, (2005), and van der Klaauw and Wolpin, (2008). 
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of φPt, to increase linearly with age. Workers that leave the labor force can re-enter; re-entry 
is denoted by the 0-1 indicator REt = 1{Pt = 1 & Pt−1 = 0}, and individuals re-entering 
the labor market incur the cost φRE . The quantity of leisure also depends on an individual's 
health status, Ht. 
Following De Nardi, (2004), workers that die value bequests of assets, At, according to the 
function b(At): 
(3) b(At) = θB
 
At + κ
/(1−ν)γ 
1 − ν . 
3.2 Budget Constraints 
The individual holds three forms of wealth: assets (including housing); pensions; and Social 
Security. He has several sources of income: asset income, rAt, where r denotes the constant 
pre-tax interest rate; labor income, WtNt, where Wt denotes wages; spousal income, yst; pen-
sion benefts, pbt; the sum of Social Security, Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security 
Income benefts, sst; and government transfers, trt. The asset accumulation equation is 
(4) At+1 = At + Yt + trt − Mt − Ct. 
Mt denotes medical expenses. Post-tax income, Yt = Y (rAt,WtNt, yst, sst, pbt, τ), is a func-
tion of taxable income and the tax structure τ . τ includes general income taxes, payroll taxes, 
and taxation of Social Security benefts (Jones and Li, 2016). 
Individuals face the borrowing constraint 
(5) At + Yt + trt − Ct ≥ 0. 
Because it is illegal to borrow against future Social Security benefts and difcult to borrow 
against many forms of future pension benefts, individuals with low non-pension, non-Social 
Security wealth may not be able to fnance their retirement before their Social Security benefts 
become available at age 62 (Kahn 1988; Rust and Phelan 1997; Gustman and Steinmeier 
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2005).3 
Following Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes, (1994, 1995), government transfers provide a con-
sumption foor: 
3 We assume time­t medical expenses are realized after time­t labor decisions have been made. We view this 
as preferable to the alternative assumption that the time­t medical expense shocks are fully known when workers 
decide whether to hold on to their employer­provided health insurance. Given the borrowing constraint and 
timing of medical expenses, an individual with extremely high medical expenses this year could have negative 
net worth next year. Because many people in our data have unresolved medical expenses, medical expense 
debt seems reasonable. 
(6) trt = max{0, Cmin − (At + Yt)}. 
Equation (6) implies that government transfers bridge the gap between an individual's "liquid 
resources" (the quantity in the inner parentheses) and the consumption foor. Treating Cmin 
as a sustenance level, we further require that Ct ≥ Cmin. Our treatment of government 
transfers implies that individuals will always consume at least Cmin, even if their out-of-
pocket medical expenses exceed their fnancial resources. Equation (6) captures provisions 
such as the medically needy pathway for Medicaid, debt removal through bankruptcy, or debt 
forgiveness by hospitals. 
3.3 Health, Medical Expenses and Health Insurance 
The individual faces both health and mortality risk. His health status, Ht, can take on three 
values: good, bad, and disabled. The probability of surviving to age t+1, conditional on being 
alive at age t, is given by st. As described in appendix B.2, we allow st and the transition 
probabilities for health to depend on previous health and age. 
We defne Zt as the sum of total medical expenses paid to providers, regardless of who pays for 
them. In our empirical analysis, the payment side of Zt will include payments by all payors, 
patients, insurers, Medicare, and Medicaid. The process for total expenses depends on health, 
marital status, age and the person-specifc component ψt: 
(7) ln Zt = µz(Ht, SPt, t) + σz(Ht, SPt, t) × ψt 
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Even after controlling for health status, French and Jones, (2004) fnd that medical expenses 
are very volatile and persistent. Thus we model the person-specifc component of medical 
expenses, ψt, as 
(8)	 ψt = ζt + ξt, ξt ∼ N (0, σξ 2) 
(9)	 ζt = ρmζt−1 + εt, εt ∼ N (0, σε 2) 
where ξt and Et are serially and mutually independent. ξt is the transitory component, while 
ζt is the persistent component, with autocorrelation ρm. 
There are several diferent types of health insurance model. As a frst step, it is useful to 
characterize an individual by his access to employer-provided health insurance (EPHI), which 
we denote by It. At the beginning of a period, the individual fnds himself in one of three 
mutually exclusive states: 
1.	 retiree health insurance that he can hold on to until his death. 
2.	 tied health insurance that he will lose shortly after his current job terminates. If a worker 
with tied health insurance leaves his job, he can keep his health insurance coverage for 
that year. This is meant to proxy for the fact that most frms must provide "COBRA" 
health insurance to workers after they leave their job. After one year of tied coverage 
and not working, the individual's insurance ceases.4 
3.	 non-group insurance, i.e., an individual is on his own. He has the choice between pur-
chasing insurance on the private non-group market or being uninsured. 
Accounting for the choices of those in the non-group category, there are four types of privately-
provided health insurance: retiree, tied, private, and uninsured. 
Workers move between these insurance categories according to the rules defned in appendix A.1 
4 Although there is some variability across states as to how long individuals are eligible for employer­provided 
health insurance coverage, by Federal law most individuals are covered for 18 months (Gruber and Madrian, 
1996). Given a model period of one year, we approximate the 18­month period as one year. We do not model 
the option to take up COBRA, assuming that the take­up rate is 1003. The actual take­up rate is around 
3
2 
(Gruber and Madrian, 1996). In French and Jones, (2011) we conducted a robustness test where we simulated 
the model assuming that the rate was 03, so that individuals transitioned from tied to non-group as soon as 
they stopped working, and found very similar labor supply patterns. 
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(Table 10). 
In addition to private coverage, individuals may receive Medicare and/or Medicaid benefts, 
according to the following rules: 
1.	 Medicare insurance if he is either disabled or has reached the age of 65.5 
2. An individual will qualify for Medicaid insurance if he is poor enough to receive Supple-
mental Security Income and he is eithers disabled or has reached the age of 65.6 
Both Medicare and Medicaid operate on top of the private coverage, although some combi-
nations are impossible. We model the interaction of public and private health insurance as 
follows: 
1. In actual practice the interaction of employer (retiree or tied) coverage with Medicare is 
complicated, depending on employment and frm size (Centers for Medicare and Medi-
caid Services, 2014). We assume instead that all individuals receiving both EPHI and 
Medicare share a "joint" plan that difers only by demographics (t and SPt). 
2. Many households purchase "Medigap" insurance to help pay for expenses not covered by 
Medicare. Our model abstracts away from this choice, and our empirical estimates will 
combine the two coverages. 
3.	 Medicaid insurance is intended to be the payer of last resort, which is to say that Medicaid 
covers only the co-payments and deductibles left behind by other insurers. 
4. While Medicaid covers Medicare premia, it does not cover the premia associated with 
private insurance. As Brown and Finkelstein, (2008) show, the latter provision can at 
times strongly discourage the purchase of private insurance. 
5. The eligibility rules of the DI program require that the individual not work during the 
application period, although he may work later. As a result, an individual with tied 
Individuals who have paid into the Medicare system for at least 10 years become eligible at age 65. A more 
detailed description of the Medicare eligibility rules is available at http:IIwww.redicare.govI. 
6 Our defnition of Medicaid is that of "categorically needy" recipients, who qualify because their income and 
wealth are low, regardless of their medical conditions. The provision of Medicaid through other mechanisms, 
the most important of which is the "medically needy" provision, is captured by the consumption foor. 
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5 
coverage will lose this coverage if he transitions to DI and the associated Medicare and 
Medicaid coverage. 
Let I+ denote the health insurance coverage the household receives after it has (possibly)t 
decided whether to purchase private non-group coverage and after i's Medicaid eligibility has 
been determined. The realized value of I+ determines how the total health care cost Ztt 
translates into out-of-pocket expendituresMt via the formula 
Mt = premium(I
+ , t, Pt, ZZt, SPt) + copay(I+ , Zt),t t ZZt = E[Zt | t, Ht, ζt−1]. (10) 
Here premium(·) is the health insurance premium, which can depend on expected medical 
expenditures, ZZt; the function copay(I+ , Zt) determines how much of Zt is assigned to the in-t 
dividual via co-payments and deductibles. We estimate both premium(·) and copay(·)-function 
directly from the MEPS data. See the appendix for more details. 
3.. Marital Status and Spousal Income 
Because spousal income can serve as insurance against medical shocks, and because marital 
status afects eligibility for Medicaid and other government programs, we include it in the 
model. We assume that when a spouse is present, spousal income yst takes on two values: 
(i) zero; or (ii) a positive value that varies with age. We assume the transition probabilities 
for marital status, and whether the spouse has positive income depend on its current current 
marital status and income, current health, and age: see appendix B.5 for details. 
3.5 Wages 
We assume that the logarithm of wages at time t, ln Wt, is a function of health status (Ht), 
age (t), hours worked (Nt) and an autoregressive component, ωt: 
(11) ln Wt = W (Ht, t) + α ln Nt + ωt. 
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The inclusion of hours, Nt, in the wage determination equation captures the empirical regu-
larity that, all else equal, part-time workers earn relatively lower wages than full time work-
ers. The autoregressive component ωt has the correlation coefcient ρW and the normally-
distributed innovation ηt: 
(12) ωt = ρW ωt−1 + ηt, ηt ∼ N (0, ση 2). 
3.6 Social Security, Disability Insurance, and Pensions 
Because pensions and Social Security generate potentially important retirement incentives, we 
model the two programs in detail. 
Individuals receive no Social Security benefts until they apply. Individuals can frst apply for 
benefts at age 62. Upon applying the individual receives benefts until death. The individual's 
Social Security benefts depend on his Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME), which is 
roughly his average income during his 35 highest earnings years in the labor market. 
The Social Security System provides three major retirement incentives.7 First, while income 
earned by workers with less than 35 years of earnings automatically increases their AIME, 
income earned by workers with more than 35 years of earnings increases their AIME only if 
it exceeds earnings in some previous year of work. Because Social Security benefts increase 
in AIME, this causes work incentives to drop after 35 years in the labor market. 
Second, the age at which the individual applies for Social Security afects the level of benefts. 
For every year before age 65 the individual applies for benefts, benefts are reduced by 6.67% 
of the age-65 level. This is roughly actuarially fair. But for every year after age 65 that beneft 
application is delayed, benefts rise by 5.5% up until age 70. This is less than actuarially fair, 
and encourages people to apply for benefts by age 65. 
Third, the Social Security Earnings Test taxes labor income of benefciaries at a high rate. 
For individuals aged 62-64, each dollar of labor income above the "test" threshold (of $9,120 
7 A description of the Social Security rules can be found in recent editions of the Green Book (Committee 
On Ways And Means, various years). Some of the rules, such as the beneft adjustment formula, depend on 
an individual's year of birth. Because we ft our model to a group of individuals that on average were born in 
1933, we use the beneft formula for that birth year. 
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in 1998) leads to a 1/2 dollar decrease in Social Security benefts, until all benefts have 
been taxed away. For individuals aged 65-69 in 1998, each dollar of labor income above a 
threshold of $14,500 leads to a 1/3 dollar decrease in Social Security benefts, until all benefts 
have been taxed away. Although benefts taxed away by the earnings test are credited to 
future benefts, in 1998 the Social Security Earnings Test efectively taxes the labor income of 
benefciaries aged 65-69.8 When combined with the aforementioned incentives to draw Social 
Security benefts by age 65, the Earnings Test discourages work after age 65. In 2000, the 
Social Security Earnings Test was abolished for those 65 and older. Because those born in 
1933 (the average birth year in our sample) turned 67 in 2000, we assume that the earnings 
test was repealed at age 67. These incentives are incorporated in the calculation of sst, which 
is defned to be net of the earnings test. 
Associated with Social Security program is Disability Insurance (DI). Individuals with Ht = 
disabled receive Disability benefts if their income is below a threshold. The level of the 
benefts is a function of AIME. Individuals with low AIME and low assets also receive 
top-up benefts through the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program. DI benefts are 
labor-income tested: individuals who earn more than $12,840 in 2014 do not receive any 
benefts. We model this period-by-period conditional on Ht = disabled. 
Poor individuals who are elderly or disabled (Ht = disabled or t ≥ 65) can qualify for Sup-
plemental Security Income (SSI). Individuals with income below Y SSI and assets below ASSI 
receive a transfer of (Y SSI − Yt). As described in Table 10, they also qualify for Medicaid. 
Pension benefts, pbt, are a function of the worker's age and pension wealth. Pension wealth 
(the present value of pension benefts) in turn depends on pension accruals. We assume that 
pension accruals are a function of a worker's age, labor income, and health insurance type, 
using a formula estimated from confdential HRS pension data. The data show that pension 
accrual rates difer greatly across health insurance categories; accounting for these diferences 
is essential in isolating the efects of employer-provided health insurance. When fnding an 
individual's decision rules, we assume further that the individual's existing pension wealth is a 
The credit rates are based on the beneft adjustment formula. If a year's worth of benefts are taxed away 
between ages 62 and 64, benefts in the future are increased by 6.673. If a year's worth of benefts are taxed 
away between ages 65 and 66, benefts in the future are increased by 5.53. See Olsen and Romig, 2013 for 
more details on the earnings test. 
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8 
  
1−ν1 /1−γγVt(Xt) = max L − Nt − φPtPt − φREREt − φH (Ht)Ct 
Ct,Nt,Bt,I
+ 1 − ν 
t 
+ β(1 − st+1)b(At+1)   /
+ βst+1 Vt+1 Xt+1 dF (Xt+1|Xt, t, Ct, Nt, Bt)
� �� 
function of his Social Security wealth, age, and health insurance type. Details of our pension 
model are described in Section 6.6; also see French and Jones, (2011). 
3.7 Recursive Formulation 
In addition to choosing hours, consumption, and potentially private non-group insurance vs. 
self-insurance, eligible individuals decide whether to apply for Social Security benefts; let the 
indicator variable Bt ∈ {0, 1} equal one if an individual has applied. In recursive form, the 
individual's problem can be written as 
(13) 
subject to equations (5) and (6). The vector Xt = (At, Bt−1, Ht, AIMEt, It, Pt−1, ωt, ζt−1, Υt) 
contains the individual's state variables, while the function F (·|·) gives the conditional dis-
9tribution of these state variables, using equations (4) and (7) (12). The solution to the 
individual's problem consists of the consumption rules, work rules, insurance choice rules, and 
beneft application rules that solve equation (13). These decision rules are found numerically 
using value function iteration. 
4 Modeling changes induced by the ACA 
..1 Medicaid expansion 
After 2014 low-income people can get Medicaid through the categorically needy channel, re-
gardless of asset levels. In particular the eligibility test changes from 
  
Yt < Y 
cat-needy(SPt) and At < A
cat-needy(SPt)I
+ = Medicaid if ,t (14) 
9 Because we impute pension benefts as a function of the other state variables (as in French and Jones 
2011), pension wealth is not a state variable. 
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I+ Yt < Y 
cat-needy(SPt)= Medicaid if .t 
to 
(15) 
In both cases the eligibility thresholds depend on marital status. As before the reform, indi-
viduals who fail the Medicaid eligibility tests but have catastrophic medical spending receive 
the minimum consumption level given by equation (6). 
..2 Health insurance exchanges, tax subsidies and penalties 
The ACA will afect the premium(·) and copay(·)-functions for the non-group market. First, the 
premium(·) function will no longer depend on expected medical expenses except those related 
to age, and copay(·) function will have to satisfy the actuarial value and out-of-pocket limits 
specifed by the law. Second, qualifying households will receive premium credits and cost-
sharing subsidies. In addition, those who self-insure will have to pay the shared responsibility 
penalty for not buying insurance. 
5 Estimation 
To estimate the model, we adopt a two-step strategy, similar to the one used by Gourinchas 
and Parker, (2002) and French, (2005). In the frst step we estimate or calibrate parameters 
that can be cleanly identifed without explicitly using our model. For example, we estimate 
mortality rates and health transitions straight from demographic data. In the second step, we 
estimate the preference parameters of the model, as well as the consumption foor, using the 
method of simulated moments (MSM). 
5.1 Moment Conditions 
The objective of MSM estimation is to fnd the preference vector that yields simulated life-cycle 
decision profles that "best match" (as measured by a GMM criterion function) the profles 
from the data. The moment conditions that comprise our estimator are: 
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1. Because an individual's ability to self-insure against medical expense shocks depends 
upon his asset level, we match 1/3rd and 2/3rd asset quantiles by age. We match these 
quantiles in each of T periods (ages), for a total of 2T moment conditions. 
2. We match job exit rates by age for each health insurance category.	 With three health 
insurance categories (non-group, retiree and tied), this generates 3T moment conditions. 
3. Because the value a worker places on employer-provided health insurance may depend 
on his wealth, we match labor force participation conditional on the combination of asset 
quantile and health insurance status. With 2 quantiles (generating 3 quantile-conditional 
means) and 3 health insurance types, this generates 9T moment conditions. 
4. To help identify preference heterogeneity, we utilize a series of questions in the HRS that 
ask workers about their preferences for work. We combine the answers to these questions 
into a time-invariant index, pref ∈ {high, low, out}, which is described in greater detail 
in Section 6.7. Matching participation conditional on each value of this index generates 
another 3T moment conditions. 
5. We match hours of work and participation conditional on our binary health indicator. 
This generates 4T moment conditions. 
6. Whether it is more attractive to buy private non-group health insurance or to self-insure 
against medical expense risk primarily depends on a household's asset level. Conditional 
on neither having access to employer-provided health insurance nor being eligible for 
Medicare or Medicaid, we match the fraction of households purchasing private insurance. 
Since everybody becomes eligible for Medicare at age 65, this generates 3T65 moment 
conditions, where T65 denotes all ages included in the model before 65. 
Combined, the fve preceding items result in 21T + 3T65 moment conditions. 
5.2 Initial Conditions and Preference Heterogeneity 
A key part of our estimation strategy is to compare the behavior of individuals with diferent 
forms of employer-provided health insurance. If access to health insurance is an important 
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factor in the retirement decision, we should fnd that individuals with tied coverage retire later 
than those with retiree coverage. In making such a comparison, however, we must account 
for the possibility that individuals with diferent health insurance options difer systematically 
along other dimensions as well. For example, individuals with retiree coverage tend to have 
higher wages and more generous pensions. 
We control for this "initial conditions" problem in three ways. First, the initial distribution 
of simulated individuals is drawn directly from the data. Because households with retiree 
coverage are more likely to be wealthy in the data, households with retiree coverage are more 
likely to be wealthy in our initial distribution. Similarly, in our initial distribution households 
with high levels of education are more likely to have high values of the persistent wage shock ωt. 
Second, we model carefully the way in which pension and Social Security accrual varies across 
individuals and groups. 
Finally, we control for unobservable diferences across health insurance groups by introducing 
permanent preference heterogeneity, using the approach introduced by Heckman and Singer, 
(1984) and adapted by (among others) Keane and Wolpin, (1997) and van der Klaauw and 
Wolpin, (2008). Each ndividual is assumed to belong to one of a fnite number of preference 
"types", with the probability of belonging to a particular type a logistic function of the individ-
ual's initial state vector: his age, wealth, initial wages, health status, health insurance type, 
medical expenditures, and preference index.10 We estimate the type probability parameters 
jointly with the preference parameters and the consumption foor. 
In our framework, correlations between preferences and health insurance emerge because peo-
ple with diferent preferences systematically select jobs with diferent types of health insurance 
coverage. Workers in our data set are frst observed in their ffties; by this age, all else equal, 
jobs that provide generous post-retirement health insurance are more likely to be held by 
workers that wish to retire early. One way to measure this self-selection is to structurally 
model the choice of health insurance at younger ages, and use the predictions of that model 
to infer the correlation between preferences and health insurance in the frst wave of the HRS. 
10These discrete type­based diferences are the only preference heterogeneity in our model. For this reason 
many individuals in the data make decisions diferent from what the model would predict. Our MSM procedure 
circumvents this problem by using moment conditions that average across many individuals. 
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Because such an approach is computationally expensive, we instead model the correlation 
between preferences and health insurance in the initial conditions. 
5.3 Wage Selection 
We estimate a selection-adjusted wage profle using the procedure developed in French, (2005). 
First, we estimate a fxed efects wage profle from HRS data, using the wages observed for 
individuals who are working. The fxed-efects estimator is identifed using wage growth for 
workers. If wage growth rates for workers and non-workers are the same, composition bias 
problems-the question of whether high wage individuals drop out of the labor market later 
than low wage individuals-are not a problem. However, if individuals leave the market 
because of a wage drop, such as from job loss, then wage growth rates for workers will be 
greater than wage growth for non-workers. This selection problem will bias estimated wage 
growth upward. 
We control for selection bias by fnding the wage profle that, when fed into our model, gener-
ates the same fxed efects profle as the HRS data. Because the simulated fxed efect profles 
are computed using only the wages of those simulated agents that work, the profles should 
be biased upwards for the same reasons they are in the data. We fnd this bias-adjusted wage 
profle using the iterative procedure described in French, (2005). 
6 Data and Calibrations 
6.1 HRS Data 
We estimate the model using data from the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) which is na-
tionally representative sample of initially non-institutionalized individuals, and their spouses. 
We use data from everyone in the HRS who is at least age 51, which is the youngest age 
that core members of the sample are interviewed. With the exception of assets and medical 
expenses, which are measured at the household level, our data are for male household heads. 
The HRS surveys individuals every two years, so that we have 11 waves of data covering the 
period 1992-2012. The HRS also asks respondents retrospective questions about their work 
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history that allow us to infer whether the individual worked in non-survey years. 
As noted above, the Social Security rules depend on an individual's year of birth. To ensure 
that workers in our sample face a similar set of Social Security retirement rules, we ft our 
model to the data for the cohort of individuals born in the 1940s. However, when estimating 
the stochastic processes such as marital status, health and spousal income we use the full 
sample, including older individuals. With the exception of wages and spousal income, we 
do not adjust the data for cohort efects. Because our subsample of the HRS covers a fairly 
narrow age range, this omission should not generate much bias. 
6.2 Health and mortality 
We estimate health transitions and mortality rates simultaneously by ftting the transitions 
observed in the HRS to a multinomial logit model. We allow the transition probabilities to 
depend on age and current health status. We estimate annual transition rates: combining 
annual transition probabilities in consecutive years yields two-year transition rates we can ft 
to the HRS data. Appendix B.2 describes this process in detail. 
We assign individuals to one of three health states: good, bad or disabled. First, we give 
individuals a health status of "good" if their self-reported health is excellent, very good or 
good, and a health status of "bad" if their self-reported health is fair or poor. We reclassify 
individuals as disabled if they are receiving Medicare and/or Medicaid benefts and are younger 
than 65, regardless of self reported health. We use this measure of disability because we wish 
to capture both the cash transfers, and even more importantly, the Medicare or Medicaid 
insurance received by the disabled. Because DI recipients are transferred to Social Security at 
age 65, and virtually everyone qualifes for Medicare at the same age, we are able to identify 
disability in our data only up to age 64. From age 65 forward, we collapse the space of 
health outcomes to back to {bad, good}. This requires us to estimate three health transition 
specifcations: one for the three-state health measure; one for the two-state measure; and one 
for the transtion from three states to two between ages 64 and 65.11 To simplify the structural 
model, we assume that people in the "disabled" and "bad" health categories share the same 
11 Because we can assign people to good or bad health at any age, the data we use to estimate the two­state 
models encompass a broader age range than is used in the structural model. 
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(total) medical expense distributions. 
Ages 50 → 51: Three states → three states 
Current Year 
Disabled 
Bad 
Good 
Next Year
 
Disabled Bad Good Deceased
 
95.4 0.9 0.5 3.1 
10.8 64.7 21.2 3.3 
0.3 4.3 94.9 0.6 
Ages 60 → 61: Three states → three states 
Current Year 
Disabled 
Bad 
Good 
Next Year
 
Disabled Bad Good Deceased
 
92.8 1.4 0.7 5.0 
3.9 72.5 20.1 3.5 
0.5 6.2 92.8 0.5 
Ages 64 → 65: Three states → two states 
Current Year 
Disabled 
Bad 
Good 
Next Year 
Bad Good Deceased 
62.8 31.0 6.2 
78.7 17.5 3.8 
5.8 93.2 1.0 
Ages 70 → 71: Two states → two states 
Next Year 
Current Year Bad Good Deceased 
Bad 77.1 15.3 7.6 
Good 8.6 90.0 1.4 
Ages 80 → 81: Two states → two states 
Next Year 
Current Year Bad Good Deceased 
Bad 73.4 12.9 13.6 
Good 12.5 83.5 4.0 
Table 1: HEALTH TRANSITION PROBABILITIES 
Table 1 shows transition probabilities for selected ages. As people age, good health becomes 
less persistent, and mortality rates rise. Disability is very persistent. 
6.3 The MEPS dataset 
An important limitation of the HRS data is that it only contains data on out-of-pocket medical 
spending and lacks information on other payors of medical care, such as Medicaid, Medicare 
and private health insurance. Although there there are some self-reported survey data on total 
21
 
billable medical expenditures in the HRS, these data are mostly imputed, and are considered 
to be of low quality. To circumvent this issue, we use data from the 1996-2012 waves of the 
Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS). 
The MEPS is a nationally representative survey. Respondents are asked about health status, 
health insurance, and health care expenditures paid out-of-pocket, by Medicaid, by Medicare, 
private insurance and by other sources. The MEPS data are matched to information provided 
by providers. Although it does not capture certain types of medical expenditures, such as 
nursing home expenditures, it captures most of the sources of medical spending that are 
faced by individuals in their 50s and 60s. Sing, Banthin, Selden, Cowan, and Keehan, (2006) 
and Pashchenko and Porapakkarm, (forthcoming) provide extended comparisons between the 
MEPS data and the aggregate statistics. 
MEPS respondents are interviewed up to 5 times over a 2 year period, forming short panels. 
We aggregate the data to an annual level. We use the same sample selection rules in the 
MEPS that we use for the HRS data. Specifcally, we keep only men (although we also keep 
information on spouses of married men) ages 51 and older. drop those who were observed to 
be married over the sample period, work, or be younger than 72 in 1996, 74 in 1998, etc. As 
with the HRS data, we assign individuals a health status of "good" if self-reported health is 
excellent, very good or good, and are assigned a health status of "bad" if self-reported health 
is fair or poor. 
6.. Total Medical Spending 
MEPS has data on total medical spending by all providers. We aggregate medical spending 
to the household level and model the mean of logged medical expenses modeled as a function 
of: a quartic in age, current health status, marital status, marital status interacted with age, 
health interacted with marital status, and health status interacted with age. We estimate 
these profles using a fxed-efects estimator. 
We use fxed-efects rather than OLS for two reasons. First, diferential mortality causes 
the composition of our sample to vary with age, while we are interested in how medical 
expenses vary for the same individuals as they grow older. Second, cohort efects are likely 
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to be important. Failure to account for the secular increase in medical expenses will lead 
to understate medical expenses growth by age. Cohort efects are captured in a fxed-efect 
estimator, as they are merely the average fxed efect for all members of a given cohort. 
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Figure 1: TOTAL MEDICAL SPENDING, BY AGE AND HEALTH STATUS 
The combined variance of the medical expense shocks (ζt + ξt) is modeled with the same 
variables and functional form as the mean. 
Figure 1 presents predicted medical spending, by age, health, and marital status. Average 
medical expenses for healthy people are about 50% lower than for unhealthy people, conditional 
on age. Medical spending is relatively constant until age 75, when total medical spending 
begins to rise rapidly. De Nardi, French, Jones, and McCauley, (forthcoming) document 
similar patterns in the MCBS data. 
The model-predicted distribution of medical spending lines up well with the data. For example, 
in the data mean household medical spending is $10,310 and $13,570 for those older and 
younger than 65, respectively, of which $1,860 and $2,180 are spent out-of-pocket for those 
under and over 65, respectively. Table 2 presents further descriptives. It shows that the 
95th percentile of total medical spending is $38,470 and $48,860 for those under and over 65, 
respectively. 
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Table 2 does not include insurance premia. We describe insurance premia in section 6.5 below. 
Younger than 65 
Individual Household 
Total Out-of-pocket Total Out-of-pocket 
Mean 5,590 990 10,310 1,860 
Median 
90th percentile 
95th percentile 
1,860 
12,670 
22,450 
440 4,780 
2,420 24,030 
3,670 38,470 
65 and Older 
1,060 
4,370 
6,130 
Individual Household 
Total Out-of-pocket Total Out-of-pocket 
Mean 8,640 1,370 13,750 2,180 
Median 
90th percentile 
95th percentile 
3,690 
21,250 
34,440 
720 
3,190 
4,620 
6,900 
32,770 
48,660 
1,310 
5,000 
7,000 
Table 2: DISTRIBUTION OF MEDICAL SPENDING, BOTH TOTAL AND OUT-OF-POCKET, BY 
AGE, INDIVIDUAL VERSUS HOUSEHOLD 
6.5 Health Insurance and Medical Expenses 
We assign individuals to one of four mutually exclusive health insurance groups: retiree, tied, 
private and uninsured, as described in Section 3. In addition, they can have Medicaid or 
Medicare coverage if they are disabled. We allow for the fact that many people have Medicaid 
or Medicare coverage in addition to other coverage they might have. Both the HRS and 
MEPS have their own advantages for understanding the efect of health insurance. MEPS has 
better information on the copays and premia of diferent types of insurance. HRS has better 
information to understand the impact of health insurance on savings and labor supply. In 
both datasets individuals are asked similar questions, and we code the data similarly in both 
the HRS and MEPS. 
Our interest is in understanding how insurance afects the male head of household within 
a family. However, many of these male heads are married. A head of household may be 
uninsured although his spouse may receive insurance from her own employer, for example. To 
address this issue we aggregate medical spending variables to the household level, so that we 
can focus on household medical expense risk, but use the head's insurance status. For this 
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reason, many individuals who are "uninsured" may have positive insurance premia paid for 
their spouse's insurance. 
Many people receive health insurance through multiple sources. In order to limit the number 
of possible health insurance states, we code individuals with multiple plans as having the 
types of plans that usually have smaller premia and contribute a larger share of the coverage. 
We consider individuals with both private non-group and employer coverage to have employer 
coverage. Those with both Medicare and Medicaid coverage are coded as having Medicaid 
coverage. 
In the MEPS, individuals are asked about whether their insurance was obtained from an 
employer or from employer, or whether their insurance was privately purchased. However, 
we do not know whether an individual with employer-provided coverage could continue the 
coverage after they left their job. Thus we cannot distinguish between those who have retiree 
and tied coverage. Fortunately, French and Jones, (2011) show that those with tied coverage 
and retiree coverage have similar medical spending. Thus we assume that those with tied 
coverage have the same co-insurance rate those with retiree coverage. 
The MEPS shows the medical costs covered by each payor. This allows us to better understand 
the share of spending paid out-of-pocket, versus paid by insurers. In MEPS, medical spending 
refers to spending over the last year. However, many people are insured for only part of the 
year. We classify individuals who are insured for part of year as insured. For those individuals, 
we may be understating the premia and the amount of insurance provided. 
Table 3 presents descriptive evidence on household medical spending for those ages 50-64, 
by health insurance type. The table illuminates a few important facts. First, the uninsured 
tend to have lower total medical spending than other groups.12 The uninsured have average 
spending of $7,340 per year, whereas it is $8,420 for those who purchase insurance privately 
and $10,960 for those with employer provided coverage. Second, for all groups, payments come 
from multiple sources. Many of those who are uninsured receive a large amount of payments 
from diferent payor sources. Of the $7,340 in medical expenses of the uninsured, only $2,080 
12 Some of these diferences refect diferences in payment, since the MEPS medical expenditure data include 
only bills that were paid. One might be concerned that many medical bills of the uninsured go unpaid. However, 
MEPS also has data on claims made by providers. Claims made by providers, too, are lower for the uninsured. 
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Private Employer-
Uninsured Medicare Medicaid non-group provided Combined* 
Total expenses 7,340 17,020 15,360 8,420 10,960 20,090 
Out-of-pocket 2,080 2,920 1,040 2,620 1,910 2,340 
Pvt insurance 580 850 320 2,730 4,260 8,570 
Medicare 970 9310 4,050 840 490 4,340 
Medicaid 80 100 6,740 20 30 620 
Other govt** 1,110 1,310 470 100 160 350 
Other*** 390 160 240 90 80 80 
Out-of-pocket insurance premia 
Private ins. 450 520 110 5,940 2,800 2,220 
Medicare 130 1,160 60 160 100 860 
Employment rate 0.65 0.08 0.20 0.69 0.84 0.27 
Labour income 19,220 2,420 3,900 31,760 43,520 8,260 
Observations 9,391 1,719 5,155 2371 33,326 1,142 
MEPS data. Households with a man aged 50-64, all amounts in 2014 dollars 
*Combined=Medicaid OR Medicare AND Private or Employer Provided. 
*Other government plans=Tricare, Workers Comp, Other State/Local Plans. 
***Other=unclassifed sources including automobile, homeowner's, liability. 
Table 3: HOUSEHOLD MEDICAL SPENDING, AGES 50-64, BY INSURANCE TYPE 
is spent out-of-pocket, for example. Likewise, many or those with private insurance pay a large 
amount out-of-pocket. Those with private non-group and employer-provided insurance spend 
$2,620 and $1,910 are paid out-of-pocket by those who purchase insurance of the non-group 
market and group (ie. employer market). For this reason diferences in coinsurance rates 
between the uninsured and insured are smaller than what one might initially guess. 
Those with no insurance have their care paid for by multiple sources. After out-of-pocket 
spending, the largest payor of health care for the uninsured is "other government", which 
includes workers compensation and other state and local plans. 
Coinsurance rates and Insurance Premia: MEPS data 
For any given insurance type, the copay function copay(I+, Zt) is characterized by three pa-
rameters: the deductible ιd; the coinsurance rate ιc; and the out-of-pocket maximum. ιom. 
All costs up to the deductible ιd are paid by the patient. The patient pays the fraction ιc of 
any costs in excess of ιd, until his total payments reach the limit ιom. Any costs in excess of 
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ιom are borne by the insurer. With this structure,we have 
    
copay(Zt; ιd, ιc, ιom) = min ιom , min{ιd, Zt} + ιc · max{Zt − ιd, 0}    
= min ιom , ιcZt + (1 − ιc) min{ιd, Zt} . 
(16) 
We estimate separate copay functions for each insurance type, using non-linear least squares. 
While the estimation procedure is straightforward, the treatment of the data is not: Ap-
pendix A.1 provides additional details. Table 4 shows the estimated parameters. Of note is 
that the copay rate for the uninsured is 0.675, rather than 1. This refects payments covered 
by other government insurance. 
Copayment Out-of-pocket 
Deductible Rate Limit 
(ιd) (ιc) (ιom) 
Uninsured 1,340 0.6753 NA 
Medicaid 0 0.0360 NA 
Medicare 2,270 0.1271 NA 
Employer provided-Medicare 580 0.1911 4,810 
Employer provided 710 0.1891 6,260 
Private Non-Group 2,250 0.2094 14,440 
Notes: Employer provided includes both Retiree and Tied coverage. 
NA means no out-of-pocket limit 
Table 4: COPAYMENT PARAMETERS 
Next we estimate the insurance premia paid by households. Premia depend on marital status 
and in the non-group market also depend on predicted medical expenses. To do this we 
regress the total insurance premia paid by by all members of the household on the male head's 
insurance type, and predicted medical spending, both before and after age 65. We predict 
the household's medical spending using the previous year's medical spending. Table 5 shows 
predicted premia for diferent groups of people. 
It also shows how predicted total medical spending (as predicted by last year's total medical 
spending, age, and health status) afects current insurance premia. We fnd that for every $1 
increase in predicted total medical spending, insurance premia rises by $0.11, showing that 
although higher predicted medical spending increases insurance premia, it is much less than 
dollar for dollar. Part of this is likely due to the fact that many states mandated partial 
27
 
EPHI-
EPHI - EPHI- Medicare- Medicare-
EPHI Medicare Medicaid Medicaid Private Medicare Medicaid Medicaid 
Under 65 
Constant 1,237 2,132 820 986 2,907 1,299 182 162 
Married 1,210 826 1,109 260 2,069 503 63 60 
Predicted medical spending 0.11 
Over 65 
Constant 2,027 640 1,447 59 
Married 1,478 812 1,415 314 
Notes: EPHI includes both Retiree and Tied coverage. For those over age 65, we assume everyone 
is covered by Medicare, so the EPHI EPHI-Medicaid, Private, and Medicaid entries are empty. 
Table 5: INSURANCE PREMIA 
or complete community rating. Furthermore, Buchmueller and DiNardo, (2002) and Herring 
and Pauly, (2006) show that even in states that did not mandate community rating, higher 
expected medical spending only leads to modestly higher insurance premia. Furthermore, 
Herring and Pauly, (2006) show that this is not due to selection issues coming from people 
being denied coverage when facing high medical expenses. Perhaps unsurprisingly, we found 
that predicted medical expenses has little impact on insurance premia for those with employer 
or government provided insurance. For this reason, and for parsimony, we set these coefcients 
to zero. 
To better understand the parameters in Tables 4 and 5, Figure 2 uses the parameters to show 
predicted out-of-pocket medical spending for married households with diferent diferent levels 
of medical spending, summing over both insurance premia and copays. Of special interest is 
the diference between the budget line for the uninsured versus the budget line for those with 
private non-group insurance. The budget line shows that for households with less than $17,000 
in total medical spending, choosing to be uninsured is cheaper than choosing to be insured in 
the private non-group market. However, many households with lower total medical spending 
will select private insurance, since total medical spending is uncertain at the time of selection 
of insurance. Many of those whose expect medical spending above $17,000 ex ante will wind 
up with medical spending below this level ex post. Furthermore, risk aversion implies that 
those with expected medical spending below $17,000 may still purchase insurance to insure 
themselves against the risk of higher medical spending. Likewise, many households with total 
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medical spending over $17,000 will select to be uninsured, for two reasons. First, they may 
have expected medical spending that is lower than realized. Second, if they have low assets 
and income, their copays will be covered by the consumption foor. Thus they will use the 
implicit insurance from the consumption foor as a substitute for private insurance. 
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Figure 2: BUDGET SETS BY HEALTH INSURANCE TYPE, TOTAL EXPENSES UP TO $50,000 
Idiosyncratic Shocks 
The parameters for the idiosyncratic process ψt, (σ
2, σ;
2, ρm), are taken from French and Jones, ξ 
(2004, "ftted" specifcation). Table 6 presents the parameters, which have been normalized so 
that the overall variance, σ2 , is one. Table 6 reveals that at any point in time, the transitory ψ
component generates almost 67% of the cross-sectional variance in medical expenses. The 
results in French and Jones reveal, however, that most of the variance in cumulative lifetime 
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Estimate 
Parameter Variable (Standard Errors) 
ρm 
σ2 ; 
σ2 ξ 
autocorrelation of persistent component 
innovation variance of persistent component 
innovation variance of transitory component 
0.925 (0.003) 
0.04811 (0.008) 
0.6668 (0.014) 
Table 6: VARIANCE AND PERSISTENCE OF INNOVATIONS TO MEDICAL EXPENSES 
medical expenses is generated by innovations to the persistent component. For this reason, 
estimates of the cross sectional distribution of medical expenses understate the lifetime risk of 
medical expenses. Given the autocorrelation coefcient ρm of 0.925, this is not surprising. 
6.6 Pension Accrual 
Our formula for pension accrual rates comes from French and Jones, (2011), who estimate 
them using confdential HRS pension data. Figure 3, taken from French and Jones, (2011), 
shows the average pension accrual rates generated by this formula when we simulate the model. 
Figure 3: AVERAGE PENSION ACCRUAL RATES, BY AGE AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVER-
AGE 
Figure 3 reveals that workers with retiree coverage face the sharpest drops in pension accrual 
after age 60.13 While retiree coverage in and of itself provides an incentive for early retirement, 
13 Because Figure 3 is based on our estimation sample, it does not show accrual rates for earlier ages. 
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the pension plans associated with retiree coverage also provide the strongest incentives for early 
retirement. Failing to capture this link will lead the econometrician to overstate the efect of 
retiree coverage on retirement. 
6.7 Preference Index 
In order to better measure preference heterogeneity in the population (and how it is correlated 
with health insurance), we estimate a person's "willingness" to work using three questions from 
the frst (1992) wave of the HRS. The frst question asks the respondent the extent to which 
he agrees with the statement, "Even if I didn't need the money, I would probably keep on 
working." The second question asks the respondent, "When you think about the time when 
you will retire, are you looking forward to it, are you uneasy about it, or what?" The third 
question asks, "How much do you enjoy your job?" 
To combine these three questions into a single index, we regress wave 5-7 (survey year 2000-
2004) participation on the response to the three questions along with polynomials and inter-
actions of all the state variables in the model: age, health status, wages, wealth, and AIME, 
medical expenses, and health insurance type. Multiplying the numerical responses to the three 
questions by their respective estimated coefcients and summing yields an index. We then 
discretize the index into three values: high, for the top 50% of the index for those working in 
wave 1; low, for the bottom 50% of the index for those working in wave 1; and out for those 
not working in wave 1. 
6.8 Wages 
Recall from equation (11) that ln Wt = α ln(Nt) + W (Ht, t) + ωt. Following Aaronson and 
French, (2004), we set α = 0.415, which implies that a 50% drop in work hours leads to a 25% 
drop in the ofered hourly wage. This is in the middle of the range of estimates of the efect 
of hours worked on the ofered hourly wage. 
We estimate W (Ht, t) using the methodology described in section 5.3. 
Estimates that include the validation sample show, however, that those with retiree coverage have the highest 
pension accrual rates in their early and middle 50s. 
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The parameters for the idiosyncratic process ωt, (ση
2, ρW ) are estimated by French, (2005). The 
results indicate that the autocorrelation coefcient ρW is 0.977; wages are almost a random 
walk. The estimate of the innovation variance ση 
2 is 0.0141; one standard deviation of an 
innovation in the wage is 12% of wages. 
6.9 Remaining Calibrations 
We set the interest rate r equal to 0.03. Spousal income depends upon an age polynomial and 
health status. Health status and mortality both depend on previous health status interacted 
with an age polynomial. 
7 Data Profles and Initial Conditions 
7.1 Data Profles 
Figure 4 puts some of the labor market behavior that we seek to explain in relation to the 
health insurance status. By correctly estimating the structural parameters linking the two 
(and the broader environment), we will be able to predict the efects of the ACA on exit rates 
and participation. The top panel of Figure 4 shows empirical job exit rates conditional on 
the initially observed health insurance type. Recall that Medicare should provide the largest 
labor market incentives for workers that have tied health insurance. If these people place a 
high value on health insurance, they should either work until age 65, when they are eligible 
for Medicare, or they should work until age 63.5 and use COBRA coverage as a bridge to 
Medicare. The job exit profles in the top panel provide some evidence that those with tied 
coverage do tend to work until age 65. While the age-65 job exit rate is similar for those 
whose health insurance type is tied (17%), retiree (17%), or non-group (14%), those with 
retiree coverage have higher exit rates at 62 (20%) than those with tied (15%) or non-group 
(13%). At all ages other than 65, those with retiree coverage have higher job exit rates than 
those with tied coverage, often much higher. These values for the 1940s cohort are very similar 
to those reported by French and Jones, (2011) for the 1931-1936 cohort. 
The low job exit rates before age 65 and the relatively high job exit rates at age 65 for those 
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 with tied coverage suggests that some people with tied coverage are working until age 65, 
when they become eligible for Medicare. On the other hand, job exit rates for those with tied 
coverage are lower than those with retiree coverage for every age other than 65, and are not 
much higher at age 65. This suggests that diferences in health insurance coverage may not 
be the only reason for the diferences in job exit rates. 
The bottom panel of Figure 4 presents the employment rates that result from these exit rates 
and the initial employment rates. It is not surprising that the non-group category has the 
lowest participation rates already at the beginning since it includes Medicare and Medicaid 
recipients who are eligible for SSDI because they are unable to work. While the initially high 
employment rate of those with tied coverage is not surprising (recall that these individuals 
must have been working in the previous period to have access to their employers group plan, 
either directly or through COBRA coverage), it stays consistently higher than any of the other 
two groups. Conversely, the high exit rates of those with retiree coverage lead to similar levels 
of participation as those without access to group insurance already in individuals' mid-sixties. 
Figure 5 shows that the preference index described in Section 6.7 has great predictive power. 
At age 65, participation rates are 60% for those with an index of high, 45% for those with an 
index of low, and 9% for those with an index of out. 
7.2 Initial Conditions 
Each artifcial individual in our model begins its simulated life with the state vector of an 
individual born in the 1940s, aged 51-60 when frst observed in the data. Table 7 summarizes 
this initial distribution. 
Table 7 shows that asset levels are highest for individuals with tied health insurance and almost 
half of that in the non-group category, individuals with retiree coverage being somewhere in the 
middle. A reason for the diference between the tiedand retiree groups may be that the latter 
tend to have more generous pension plans. Pension wealth in both groups is far higher than in 
the non-group category in fact, the median individual without access to employer-provided 
insurance does not have any pension wealth at all. Individuals in the non-group category are 
also more likely to be in bad health, and not surprisingly, less likely to be working. In contrast, 
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 individuals with tied coverage have high values of the preference index, suggesting that their 
delayed retirement refects diferences in preferences as well as in incentives. 
Individuals with retiree coverage have the lowest medical expenses, both in terms of total 
expenditure and in terms of out-of-pocket costs, where those in the non-group category are 
similar. These latter individuals have much higher total expenditure, which is-at least in 
part-a refection of their poor health. 
A key step for being able to predict the efects of the ACA and a major innovation relative 
to French and Jones, (2011) is to adequately break up the non-group category according 
to eligibility for Medicare through SSDI and Medicaid through SSI and the choice between 
private coverage and staying uninsured for those who are not eligible. Table 8 displays the 
initial distribution for individuals without employer-provided coverage, i.e., everybody in the 
respective column of Table 7. Individuals who purchase private insurance are very similar to 
individuals in the tied and retiree categories along many dimensions they are quite healthy, 
often married, likely to be and working and putting in long hours if doing so, and they have high 
values of the preference index. However, they have more assets, which presumably compensate 
for their lower pension wealth and higher medical expenses. 
Conversely, the uninsured are in worse health, have lower values of the preference index, are 
less likely to be working and they are more often single. Their health care costs are low and 
on average, they have less than a ffth of the wealth and less than half of the pension wealth 
of those who purchase private insurance. 
People who are eligible for Medicare through SSDI are in poor health by defnition. Only 11% 
of them are working and those individuals are mostly doing part-time work only, refecting 
overall incentives. They are less likely to be married and their wealth variables are comparable 
to those of the uninsured. The last column shows, not surprisingly, that Medicaid recipients 
are poorer on average and fare worse on almost all socio-demographic dimensions. Their low 
out-of-pocket medical expenditures refect the generosity of Medicaid, the high total costs are 
an artefact of our imputation procedure that inverts the budget sets using the parameters 
shown in 4 In sum, it is clear that the uninsured are worse of along many dimensions than 
those who purchase private insurance and that the Medicare/Medicaid programs might have 
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important incentive efects for this group well before age 65. 
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Figure 4: JOB EXIT AND PARTICIPATION (EMPLOYMENT) RATES, DATA 
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No Employer 
Retiree Tied Coverage 
Variable Statistic 
Age Mean 53.2 53.5 53.5 
Median 52.0 53.0 53.0 
Std.Dev. 2.1 2.1 2.2 
AIME / 1000 Mean 15.8 17.0 11.1 
Median 16.9 17.4 7.7 
Std.Dev. 7.7 8.3 13.4 
Assets / 1000 Mean 317.6 489.4 253.9 
Median 161 192.7 40.7 
Std.Dev. 569.2 990.1 717.6 
Pension Wealth / 1000 Mean 199.0 162.1 25.0 
Median 77.1 57.2 0.0 
Std.Dev. 293.9 318.3 90.5 
Works Fraction 0.86 0.95 0.58 
Wage if working Mean 25.5 29.5 20.1 
Median 22.9 25.9 15.2 
Std.Dev. 13.5 16.6 14.5 
Hours if working Mean 240.02 2469.7 2283.4 
Median 2200.0 2340.0 2080.0 
Std.Dev. 654.5 629.3 942.1 
Total health care costs / 1000 Mean 16.26 22.69 29.33 
Median 8.39 11.47 2.61 
Std.Dev. 21.87 29.00 134.80 
OOP health care costs / 1000 Mean 4.09 5.37 4.03 
Median 2.16 2.73 1.34 
Std.Dev. 12.00 7.76 11.30 
Good health Fraction 0.82 0.88 0.57 
Pref. index  0 Fraction 0.14 0.05 0.42 
Pref. index  1 Fraction 0.77 0.88 0.48 
Pref. index  2 Fraction 0.09 0.07 0.10 
Married Fraction 0.85 0.8 0.62 
Not married Fraction 0.15 0.2 0.38 
Observations Count 1081 561 500 
Table 7: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE INITIAL DISTRIBUTION 
Note: Source: HRS data. Total health care costs are imputed from out­of­pocket health care costs by 
inverting the budget sets described in 6.5, estimated of MEPS data. The column "No Employer Coverage" 
refects individuals in the non-group category. 
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Private Medicare-
Non-Group Uninsured Medicare Medicaid 
Variable Statistic 
Age Mean 53.5 53.3 53.7 54.1 
Median 53.0 53.0 54.0 54.0 
Std.Dev. 2.2 2.1 2.4 2.2 
AIME / 1000 Mean 13.6 9.5 13.4 11.6 
Median 12.8 7.4 7.8 5.4 
Std.Dev. 7.5 7.0 18.3 26.7 
Assets / 1000 Mean 768.7 144.5 136 24.1 
Median 375.6 35.4 41.2 1.4 
Std.Dev. 1341.8 347.5 322.2 170.1 
Pension Wealth / 1000 Mean 50.1 21.9 21.1 4.0 
Median 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Std.Dev. 130.7 87.8 58.6 15.5 
Works Fraction 0.87 0.7 0.11 0.09 
Wage if working Mean 25.8 17.3 18.5 24.8 
Median 21 13.3 9.9 16.7 
Std.Dev. 16.5 12.5 15.9 18.6 
Hours if working Mean 2507.0 2240.0 1261.1 1505.7 
Median 2184.0 2080.0 1040.0 1742.0 
Std.Dev. 954.9 907.0 799.0 740.1 
Total health care costs / 1000 Mean 24.93 4.93 24.37 132.58 
Median 10.30 .90 1.97 39.04 
Std.Dev. 29.36 21.32 51.94 335.89 
OOP health care costs / 1000 Mean 6.74 3.60 4.41 1.37 
Median 3.94 0.90 1.97 0.25 
Std.Dev. 6.38 14.43 6.95 2.06 
Good health Fraction 0.87 0.69 0.0 0.17 
Pref. index 0 Fraction 0.13 0.3 0.89 0.91 
Pref. index 1 Fraction 0.75 0.57 0.08 0.09 
Pref. index 2 Fraction 0.13 0.13 0.03 0 
Married Fraction 0.75 0.65 0.56 0.34 
Not married Fraction 0.25 0.35 0.44 0.66 
Observations Count 102 265 63 70 
Table 8: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE INITIAL DISTRIBUTION OF INDIVIDUALS WITHOUT 
EMPLOYER-PROVIDED HEALTH INSURANCE 
Note: Source: HRS data. Individuals included in this table are those in the column called "No Employer 
Coverage" in Table 7. Total health care costs are imputed from out­of­pocket health care costs by inverting 
the budget sets described in 6.5, estimated of MEPS data. 
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� Conclusion
 
The Afordable Care Act (ACA) is the most signifcant reform to the health care sector in 
since the 1960s. The ACA's provisions fall into four main categories: (1) an expansion of Med-
icaid; (2) an overhaul of private non-group insurance, including community rating, coverage 
standards, the introduction of exchanges, subsidies, and purchase mandates; (3) a mandate 
for large employers to ofer health insurance coverage, and subsidies for smaller employers; 
(4) miscellaneous provisions including reforms to coverage standards, the tax code, and the 
management of Medicare. 
In this paper, we consider the following two sets of provisions. First, the ACA expands 
Medicaid eligibility for low-income households younger than 65. Prior to the ACA, low-income 
households nearing retirement qualifed for Medicaid only if they were disabled. Moreover, 
under the ACA Medicaid applicants no longer face an asset test, meaning that they can 
qualify for Medicaid even if they hold signifcant wealth. The ability to carry wealth into 
retirement should make Medicaid more attractive for older workers. Overall, the Medicaid 
expansion could either increase or reduce labor supply by the elderly. Perhaps most likely, 
fewer people will work, as they can now qualify for Medicaid if they retire. 
The second set of provisions involves non-group insurance. The ACA establishes exchanges 
where households without group coverage can purchase insurance. The policies ofered on these 
exchanges must meet coverage standards, and they must be community-rated, i.e., insurers 
cannot price-discriminate by health. The ACA also requires uninsured households ineligible 
for Medicaid to purchase insurance, provides tax subsidies for most purchases, and levies 
penalties on those not complying. These changes should signifcantly alter the customer base 
and actuarial costs in the non-group market. Although the subsidies will allow most households 
to purchase non-group insurance more cheaply, healthy and/or lightly subsidized individuals 
may see their premiums rise. Because many workers lose their employer-provided insurance 
after they leave their job (and the COBRA buy-in period expires), changes in the price of 
non-group insurance may change their retirement decisions. Because most people will be 
able to buy non-group health insurance more cheaply, early retirement will probably increase. 
Balancing against this, the subsidies provided under the ACA will allow uninsured low-income 
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workers to purchase cheap insurance in the non-group market. Prior to the ACA these people 
may have used default on medical bills as a substitute for health insurance. However, default 
is a good substitute for insurance only when income and assets are low. Acquiring health 
insurance may encourage these workers to work and save more (Hsu, 2013). 
Our goal is to assess the quantitative importance of these efects. To do this, we extend the 
structural labor supply and retirement model in French and Jones, (2011) to account for these 
reforms. We extend their model by adding in a much more detailed model of medical spending 
and insurance. We model explicitly how diferent types of health insurance plans afect the 
premiums and coinsurance rates that households face. We use data from the Health and 
Retirement Study (HRS) and the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) to estimate the 
structural model. We use the MEPS data to measure current medical expenditures, as well 
as who pays for these expenditures (out-of-pocket, private insurance, Medicaid, etc.). We use 
this information to estimate a dynamic programming model of labor supply and retirement 
behavior where individuals face realistic medical expense risk. Upon estimating the model, we 
conduct counterfactual experiments, where we modify the premia and co-insurance rates, net 
of subsidies and penalties, that households face. 
We construct a retirement model that includes health insurance, uncertain medical costs, a 
savings decision, a non-negativity constraint on assets and a government-provided consumption 
foor. 
We present evidence that those who cannot keep their employer-provided health insurance 
when they leave their job tend to remain on their job until age 65. Those who can maintain 
their insurance after they leave their job tend to exit the labor market earlier. This provides 
evidence that access to health insurance reduces labor supply. Interestingly, however, recent 
evidence on Medicaid expansions suggests small if any disemployment efect of Medicaid (Levy, 
Buchmueller, and Nikpay, 2015). 
We show diferences in both total and out-of-pocket medical spending prior to the enactment 
of the ACA. We show that average total medical spending in MEPS is high for all groups. 
Perhaps surprisingly, those with no health insurance do not spend much more out-of-pocket 
than those who private insurance. Those uninsured receive health care through a variety 
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of sources such as worker's compensation and default on medical bills, which we refer to as 
a "consumption foor", which protects low income individuals against catastrophic medical 
spending. Those who appear to have the highest resources appear to be those who pay the 
most for health care, consistent with the view that those with low resources are covered by 
the consumption foor, whereas those with high resources face the most medical expense risk 
and might have the largest labor supply responses. We choose the consumption foor to match 
these, and other facts. Thus we model the ACA as a change in government insurance provisions 
rather than the provision of insurance where none existed before. 
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A Cast of Characters
 
Preference Parameters Health-related Parameters 
γ consumption weight Ht health status 
β time discount factor Zt total medical expenses 
ν coefcient of RRA, utility It employer-provided HI type 
θB bequest weight z(·) mean shifter, logged medical expenses 
κ bequest shifter σ(·) volatility shifter, logged medical expenses 
Cmin consumption foor ψt idiosyncratic medical expense shock 
L leisure endowment ζt persistent medical expense shock 
φH leisure cost of bad health Et innovation, persistent shockk 
φPt fxed cost of work ρm autocorrelation, persistent shock 
φP 0 fxed cost, intercept σ
2 innovation variance, persistent shock ; 
φP 1 fxed cost, time trend	 ξt transitory medical expense shock 
φRE re-entry cost	 σξ 
2 variance, transitory shock 
Mt out-of-pocket medical expenses 
Decision Variables	 Wage-related Parameters 
Ct consumption 
Nt hours of work 
Lt leisure 
Pt participation 
At assets 
Bt Social Security application 
I+ health insurance type t 
Financial Variables 
Wt hourly wage 
W (·) mean shifter, logged wages 
α coefcient on hours, logged wages 
ωt idiosyncratic wage shock 
ρW autocorrelation, wage shock 
ηt innovation, wage shock 
σ2 innovation variance, wage shock η 
Miscellaneous 
Y (·) after-tax income st survival probability 
τ tax parameter vector pref discrete preference index 
r real interest rate Xt state vector, worker's problem 
yst spousal income λ(·) compensating variation 
Υ spousal income indicator SP spouse indicator 
sst Social Security income T number of years in GMM criterion 
AIMEt Social Security wealth 
pbt pension benefts 
Table 9: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS, MAIN TEXT 
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A.1 Health Insurance
 
Table 10 presents the health insurance state transitions that we allow for. These transitions 
depend on work status, age, and whether the individual is eligibile for the DI (Disability 
Insurance) or SSI (Supplemental Seccurity Income) programs. The last column of the table 
presents the payment sources and, if applicable, whether the individual has the choice between 
purchasing private non-group insurance and staying uninsured. We allow for the most common 
health insurance transitions observed in our data, and do not allow for transitions that are 
so uncommon empirically that we are unable to estimate the budget set parameters for these 
groups. Hence, there are a few things to note about Table 10: 
•	 People will hold on to Retiree Health Insurance until their death, unless they become 
eligible for Medicaid by falling into the categorically needy category. Although in prin-
ciple individuals could keep employer provided coverage while drawing Medicaid, our 
estimated insurance premia and co-insurance rates suggest that Medicaid alone is less 
expensive than Medicaid plus employer provided coverage since Medicaid pays for the 
same care private insurance pays for, but Medicaid does not pay the private insurance 
premia. Furthermore. eligibility requirements for Medicaid are so strict that these people 
would have to spend a very large fraction of their income on Retiree insurance premia. 
Reassuringly, very few people hold both empolyer provided and Medicaid insurance sim-
ulataneously. 
•	 Closely related to the above case, individuals loose their Tied coverage if they become 
eligible for Medicaid. Again, very few people in the data simultaneously hold both 
employer provided insurance and Medicaid. Being eligible for Medicaid while working 
requires a very low wage or a very low number of hours, and individiuals with low hours 
or wages usually do not receive employer-provided coverage. 
•	 Before age 65, the combination of Tied insurance and Medicare is impossible in the 
model because of individuals must be out of work for one year to be eligible for Disability 
Insurance. 
•	 Everybody becomes eligible for Medicare at age 65. We do not model supplemental 
coverage. Hence, the "Uninsured" and "Private Non-Group" categories disappear after 
age 65. The same holds true for standalone Medicaid. 
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• Disabled people younger than age 65 can receive Medicare, Medicaid, or both depending 
on eligibility for DI and SSI. DI benefciaries receive Medicare, whereas SSI benefciaries 
receive Medicaid.
 
To be eligible for DI one must have worked 5 of the last 10 years, and at least a total of
 
(for a 54 year old) 8 years. Those who worked fewer years only receive SSI.
 
The SSI maximum beneft amount in this case is $721. This maximum beneft is only 
available to those with extremely low income and assets. Those with higher income have 
their beneft clawed back. 
So who gets both DI and SSI? It is the people whose work criteria says they can get 
DI, but their beneft is below the threshold. The DI beneft is calculated the same way 
as the Social Security beneft, using AIME, which is our state variable. So if their DI 
beneft would be $500, then they would get at $221 SSI beneft. This would make them 
eligible for both Medicaid and Medicare. 
We approximate these rules as follows: 
�	 We assume that everybody who becomes disabled meets the work requirements for 
DI 
�	 Disabled individuals who do not meet the categorically needy criteria, are auto-
matically DI/Medicare, 
�	 For disabled individuals who are categorically needy, we use the model to calculate 
the DI beneft using AIME. If the beneft is over $721, they receive only Medicare. 
Else, they receive Medicare and Medicaid if their DI beneft is over $400 and only 
Medicaid if it is below this value 
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Table 10: Health Insurance State Transitions 
It−1 Pt−1 = 1 It t Ht cat. needy Payment 
= disabled Yt, At sources 
retiree . retiree < 65 no . R 
yes no R + MC 
≥ 65 . no R + MC 
non-group < 65 yes yes (MC +) MA 
≥ 65 . yes MC + MA 
tied yes tied < 65 no . T 
≥ 65 . no T + MC 
non-group ≥ 65 . yes MC + MA 
no non-group < 65 no . {U, P} 
yes no MC 
yes (MC +) MA 
≥ 65 . no MC 
yes MC + MA 
non-group . non-group < 65 no . {U, P} 
yes no MC 
yes (MC +) MA 
≥ 65 . no MC 
yes MC + MA 
Legend for payment sources: 
R Employer's retiree plan Pt = 1 if working 
T Employer's tied plan It = insurance type 
U Uninsured 
P Privately purchased insurance plan 
MC Medicare 
MA Medicaid 
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  premium = 
⎧ ⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨ ⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
 
premium(t, Pt) if I
+ 
t = retiree 
premium(t, Pt) if I
+ 
t = tied 
premium t, Isubsidy t if I
+ 
t = non-group & priv. plan & t < 65 
Ipenalty t if I
+ 
t = non-group & uninsured & t < 65 
Individuals' insurance status determines how total health care cost Zt translate into out-of-
pocket expenditures Mt. These expenditures include insurance premia and expenses covered 
by the consumption foor, they are given by: 
(17)
 
Mt
 
Zt
 Z
= premium(I+ t , t, Pt, Zt, SPt) + copay(I
+ 
t 
Z , Zt), 
= E[Zt | t, Ht, ζt−1]. 
Zt, SPt) is the health insurance premium; the function copay(I
+ 
determines how much of Zt is assigned to the individual via co-payments and deductibles. We 
estimate the copay(·)-function directly from the MEPS data. The premium-function difers 
across insurance types as follows: 
hwhere premium(I+ t , t, Pt, , Zt)t 
(18) premium = 
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨ ⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
 
premium(t, Pt) if I
+ 
t = retiree 
premium(t, Pt) if I
+ 
t = tied 
premium( ZZt) if I+ t = non-group ∩ priv. plan 
0 if I+ t = non-group ∩ self-insure 
⎧ 
Z
Note the premium depends on labor force participation Pt in the retiree and tied categories 
because employer subsidies are typically reduced upon termination of a job. We estimate those 
values directly from the data. We assume that insurers in private plans use a pricing rule that 
is increasing more in expected costs: 
Zt,(19) premium(I
+ = non-group & priv. plan, t, ZZt, SPt) = α0 + α1 · 1{SPt = 1} + α2t 
where all coefcents are positive.
 
After the introduction of the ACA, the premium function (18) becomes:
 
(20) 
The copay(It, Zt) is age-invariant and translates total expenses (Zt) into out-of-pocket expenses 
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    copay(Zt; ιd, ιc, ιom) = min ιom , min{ιd, Zt} + ιc · max{Zt − ιd, 0} 
= min ιom , ιcZt + (1 − ιc) min{ιd, Zt} . 
 
using three insurance type-specifc parameters: the deductible ιd, the coinsurance rate ιc, and 
the out-of-pocket limit ιom: 
(21) 
The estimates are shown in Table 4 in the main text. While the estimation of these param-
eters using non-linear least squares is standard, constructing the proper subsamples for each 
estimation type is not. Many households in the MEPS receive insurance from multiple payers, 
in a way that does not correspond directly to the insurance categories in the model, and the 
assignment of households to insurance categories is plagued by selection dynamics. This leads 
us to make several sample construction decisions: 
•	 Because a number of Medicaid recipients over the age of 64 qualify for Medicaid through 
the Medically Needy provision, which requires them to spend down their income and 
assets on medical services, we estimate the parameters for Medicaid using data for house-
holds with heads younger than 65. 
•	 The Medicaid coinsurance rates are estimated using the expenditures that remain after 
Medicare, other government, and private insurer contributions. 
•	 For households where Medicaid is not the primary insurance, Medicaid payments are 
treated as out-of-pocket costs borne by the households. This is because Medicaid is the 
residual payer, and in the model is applied to the costs that remain after other types of 
insurance have been applied. 
•	 Many households that list Medicare or EPHI as their (sole) primary insurer receive 
assistance from multiple sources. We treat these payments (excluding Medicaid) as part 
of the coverage provided by the principal insurer. 
•	 Because many of the self-insured have access to other government coverage, their pay-
ment histories are not representative of people without EPHI or Medicare as a whole. 
People without other government coverage are more likely to purchase non-group in-
surance. We thus expand the estimation sample for the "uninsured" to include any 
household younger than 65 that lacks EPHI or Medicare, and we treat costs covered by 
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 � / 
private non-group insurance as out-of-pocket expenditures. We view these costs as the 
costs households would face if they chose to self-insure. 
Implicit in our approach above is the assumption that medical expenditures are exogenous. It 
is not clear ex ante whether this causes us to understate or overstate the importance of health 
insurance. On the one hand, individuals with health insurance receive better care. Our model 
does not capture this beneft, and in this respect understates the value of health insurance. 
Conversely, treating medical expenses as exogenous ignores the ability of workers to ofset 
medical shocks by adjusting their expenditures on medical care. This leads us to overstate the 
consumption risk facing uninsured workers, and thus the value of health insurance. Evidence 
from other structural analyses suggests that our assumption of exogeneity leads us to overstate 
the efect of health insurance on retirement.14 
A.2 Timing of model decisions 
It = {At, Bt−1, AIMEt, It, Ht, ωt, yst, ζt−1, εt−1, 
F Xt+1�Xt, t, Ct, Nt, Bt
ξt−1, εt−1 
realised 
ηt, Ht, ♥t 
realised 
Ct, Nt, Bt, It 
decided upon / 
Eligibility for 
ξt, εt 
realised 
At, AIMEt, It, yst Medi-caid-care 
determined checked 
14 To our knowledge, Blau and Gilleskie, (2008) is the only estimated, structural retirement study to have 
endogenous medical expenditures. Although Blau and Gilleskie, (2008) do not discuss how their results would 
change if medical expenses were treated as exogenous, they fnd that even with several mechanisms (such as 
prescription drug benefts) omitted, health insurance has "a modest impact on employment behavior among 
older males". De Nardi, French, and Jones, (2010) study the saving behavior of retirees. They fnd that the 
efects of reducing means­tested social insurance are smaller when medical care is endogenous, rather than 
exogenous. They also fnd, however, that even when medical expenditures are a choice variable, they are a 
major reason why the elderly save. 
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B	 Key Changes to the Model for the Situation pre-ACA (rela-
tive to French and Jones, 2011) 
B.1 Better Modeling of Medical Spending 
We change from: 
ln Mt = m(Ht, It, t, Pt) + σ(Ht, It, t, Pt) · ψt 
to 
ln Zt = µz(Ht, SPt, t) + σz(Ht, SPt, t) × ψt 
Mt = premium(I
+, t, Pt, ZZt, SPt) + copay(I+, Zt),t	 t ZZt = E[Zt | t, Ht, ζt−1]. 
where Zt denotes total medical expenses, premium(·) is the health insurance premium, and 
the function copay(·) determines how much of Zt is assigned to the individual via co-payments 
and deductibles. 
We will estimate the parameters of these functions using MEPS. 
B.2 Health States and their Transitions 
Health can take on the following possible values: good, bad or disabled. Because we use both 
the HRS and MEPS, we exploit measures that exit in both datasets. We assign individuals a 
health status of "good" if self-reported health is excellent, very good or good; and we assign 
a health status of "bad" if self-reported health is fair or poor. "Disabled" is identifed by an 
indicator equal to 1 if the individual is receiving Medicare and/or Medicaid benefts and is 
younger than 65, regardless of self reported health. We use this measure of disability because 
we wish to capture both the cash transfers, and even more importantly, the Medicare or 
Medicaid insurance received by the disabled. Unfortunately, however, this measure of disability 
status is missing for ages 65 and older since virtually everyone becomes Medicare eligible at 
age 65, and at the same age disability benefts are rolled into Social Security benefts. For this 
reason we assume that, conditional on age, those who are disabled or in bad health have the 
same distributions of medical spending, spousal income, and wages. 
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Let Ht ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} denote death (Ht = 0) and the 3 mutually exclusive health states of the 
living (disabled = 1, bad = 2, good = 3, respectively). Let x be a vector that includes a 
constant, a quadratic in age, and indicators for previous health and previous health interacted 
with age. Our goal is to construct the likelihood function for the transition probabilities. 
Prior to age 65, we allow the disabled to have diferent health transition probabilities than 
those in in bad or good health. Because we lack data on disability after age 65, we assume 
that at age 65 all disabled people become either dead, in bad or good health (with transition 
probabilities taken from the data), then after 65 nobody becomes disabled: the health states 
after 65 are dead, bad health and good health. Thus we must estimate three separate health 
transition probability models, for before 65, at age 65, and after 65. Although this causes 
jumps in the probability of being in either good and bad health at age 65, our estimates 
suggest there is no predicted jump in mortality rates around age 65. 
Using a logit specifcation, we have, for i ∈ {1 or , 3}, j ∈ {0, 1 or 2, 3}, 
πij,t = Pr(ht+1 = j| ht = i)   
= γij γik, 
k∈{0,1,2,3} 
γi0 ≡ 1, ∀i, 
γ1k = exp (xβk) , k ∈ {1, 2, 3}, 
γ2k = exp (xβk) , k ∈ {1, 2, 3}, 
γ3k = exp (xβk) , k ∈ {1, 2, 3}, 
Using a nested logit specifcation, we have, for i ∈ {1or2, 3}, j ∈ {0, 1or2, 3}, 
πij,t = Pr(ht+1 = j| ht = i)   
= γij γik, 
k∈{0,1,2,3} 
γi0 ≡ 1, ∀i, 
γ1k = exp (xβk) , k ∈ {1, 2, 3}, 
γ2k = exp (xβk) , k ∈ {1, 2, 3}, 
γ3k = exp (xβk) , k ∈ {1, 2, 3}, 
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Pr(ht+2 = j| ht = i) = Pr(ht+2 = j| ht+1 = k) Pr(ht+1 = k| ht = i) 
k 
= πkj,t+1πik,t. 
k 
where {βk}3 are sets of coefcient vectors and of course Pr(ht+1 = 0| ht = 0) = 1.k=0 
The formulae above give 1-period-ahead transition probabilities, Pr(ht+1 = j| ht = i). What 
we observe in the HRS dataset, however, are 2-period ahead probabilities, Pr(ht+2 = j| ht = i). 
The two sets of probabilities are linked, however, by 
This allows us to estimate {βk} directly from the data using maximum likelihood. 
B.3 Health Insurance Types 
For health insurance type, we will have retiree/tied/private/self-insure/Medicaid/Medicare. 
We assume Medicaid+Medicare is available to everyone who is disabled. The vast majority 
of individuals in the 50-64 age range who are drawing Medicaid or Medicare benefts do so 
because of DI/SSI recipiency. We assume that all disabled people can draw DI benefts, and 
SSI benefts if they earn below a threshold level and their DI beneft would have been low in 
the absence of the beneft. Consistent with the facts (describe here), many people lose cash 
benefts because of work status, but do not lose their health insurance benefts. 
B.. Discrete Hours Choices 
We assume that individuals can choose hours on a discrete grid. To be precise,
 
Nt ∈ {500, 1000, 1500, 2000, 2500, 3000, 3500}. The main reason is that it is much easier to
 
handle Medicaid/Medicare eligibility cutofs in terms of earned income this way, compared to
 
the alternative of interpolating between these values as in French and Jones, (2011).
 
B.5 Spousal Income 
Because spousal income can serve as insurance against medical shocks, and because marital 
status afects eligibility for Medicaid, we include it in the model. We denote the presence of a 
spouse with the indicator SPt, which equals 1 if the head is married and is 0 if he is single. For 
married → unmarried transitions, we do not distinguish between divorce and spousal death. 
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We assume that when a spouse is present, spousal income yst takes on two values: (i) zero; or 
(ii) a positive value that varies with age. With this assumption, we can collapse marital status 
and spousal earnings into a single variable, Υt ∈ {single, spouse with no income, spouse with 
positive income}. We assume the transition probabilities for Υt are logistic functions of its 
current value, the health of the household head, and age. We estimate the probabilities form 
the HRS, using the same approach to reconcile 1-year and 2-year transition probabilities that 
we used when estimating the health transition probabilities. 
Ages 50 → 51 
Current Year 
Single 
Spouse without income 
Spouse with income 
Next Year 
Spouse Spouse 
Single without income with income 
97.2 0.8 0.2 
1.7 86.9 11.4 
1.6 8.7 89.7 
Ages 60 → 61 
Current Year 
Single 
Spouse without income 
Spouse with income 
Next Year 
Spouse Spouse 
Single without income with income 
96.1 1.2 2.7 
1.2 83.0 15.8 
1.0 6.1 92.8 
Ages 70 → 71 
Current Year 
Single 
Spouse without income 
Spouse with income 
Next Year 
Spouse Spouse 
Single without income with income 
97.5 0.5 2.0 
2.3 66.2 31.5 
1.3 2.5 96.2 
Ages 80 → 81 
Current Year 
Single 
Spouse without income 
Spouse with income 
Next Year 
Spouse Spouse 
Single without income with income 
99.0 0.2 0.9 
5.4 48.4 46.2 
2.6 1.2 96.1 
Table 11: SPOUSAL TRANSITION PROBABILITIES: HOUSEHOLD HEAD IN GOOD HEALTH 
Table 11 shows transition probabilities for selected years when the household head is in good 
health. (The patterns are similar for all health states.) As households age, they are more 
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likely to become single. In addition, as households age spouses without income are more likely 
to transition to having income. This likely refects the initiation of Social Security or SSI 
benefts. 
Next, we estimate mean spousal income, conditional on positive income, as a function of health 
status and age. 
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